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A Unified Model of Investment Under Uncertainty
Abstract

This paper extends the theory of investment under uncertainty to incorporate fixed costs of investment, a
wedge between the purchase price and sale price of capital, and potential irreversibility of investment. In this
extended framework, investment is a non-decreasing function of q, the shadow price of installed capital. There
are potentially three investment regimes, which depend on the value of q relative to two critical values. For
values of q above the upper critical value, investment is positive and is an increasing function of q, as is
standard in the theory branch of the adjustment cost literature. For intermediate values of q, between two
critical values, investment is zero. Although this regime features prominently in the irreversibility literature, it
is largely ignored in the adjustment cost literature. Finally, if q is below the lower critical value, gross
investment is negative, a possibility that is ruled out by assumption in the irreversibility of literature. In
general, however, the shadow price q is not directly observable, so we present two examples relating q to
observable varieties.
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A Unified Model of Investment Under Uncertainty
By ANDREW B. ABEL AND JANICE C. EBERLY *
This paper extends the theory of investment under uncertainty to incorporate
fixed costs of investment, a wedge between the purchase price and sale price of
capital, and potential irreversibility of investment. In this extended framework,
investment is a nondecreasing function of q, the shadow price of installed
capital. The optimal rate of investment is in one of three regimes (positive, zero,
or negative gross investment), depending on the value of q relative to two critical
values. In general however, the shadow price q is not directly observable, so we
present two examples relating q to observable variables. (JEL E22)

If a firm can instantaneously and costlessly adjust its capital stock, then, as shown
by Dale W. Jorgenson (1963), its decision
about how much capital to use is essentially
a static decision in which the marginal product of capital is equated to the user cost of
capital. The firm's investment decision becomes an interesting dynamic problem, in
which anticipations about the future economic environment affect current invest-

ment, when frictions prevent instantaneous
and costless adjustment of the capital stock.
The investment literature of the last three
decades has focused on two types of frictions: adjustment costs and irreversibility.
In this paper, we present a simple, more
general framework that encompasses irreversibility as well as adjustment costs that
may include a fixed component. Within
this more general framework, the opti-
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mal investment behavior of the firm potentially comprises three regimes: (i) a regime
of positive gross investment; (ii) a regime of
zero gross investment; and (iii) a regime of
negative gross investment. Most of the
adjustment-cost literature tends to focus,
either implicitly or explicitly, on the first of
these regimes. The irreversibility literature
is more explicit in its recognition of regimes
of positive gross investment and zero gross
investment, and it rules out the regime of
negative gross investment by assumption.
The more general model presented here
allows a simple characterization of the conditions giving rise to each of these regimes.
In the adjustment-cost literature, based
on the seminal work of Robert Eisner and
Robert H. Strotz (1963), the adjustment-cost
function is typically assumed to be strictly
convex and to have a value of zero at zero
investment. Although a few studies mention
the possibility of fixed costs (see Michael
Rothschild, 1971; Stephen J. Nickell, 1978),
there is virtually no formal analysis of these
fixed costs. The model presented in this
paper incorporates fixed costs.
During the 1970's and 1980's, the adjustment-cost literature began to merge with
the literature on Tobin's q. James Tobin

(1969) argued that the optimal rate of investment is an increasing function of the
ratio of the market value of the firm to the
replacement cost of the firm's capital-a
ratio that he called q and that has come to
be known as "average q." Michael Mussa
(1977) showed in a deterministic model, and
1369
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Abel (1983) showed in a stochastic model,
that the optimal rate of investment is the
rate that equates the marginal adjustment
cost with the marginal value of installed
capital, a concept known as "marginal q."
While average q is a potentially observable
number, it is marginal q that is relevant for
investment decisions. Fumio Hayashi (1982)
presented conditions under which average q

del by Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1981) and
in a stochastic model by Lucas and Edward
C. Prescott (1971). Curiously, both of these
papers introduce the constraint that gross
investment is nonnegative in the formal optimization problem, yet neither paper comments on this assumption, nor does either
paper use the term "irreversibility." In effect, these papers take as a postulate that
and marginal q are equal.
gross investment cannot be negative. In conAs indicated earlier, the assumption that
trast, our model incorporates Arrow's obinvestment is irreversible is another type of
servation that the resale price of capital
friction that makes the investment decision
may be below the price of new capital, and
an interesting dynamic problem. In a semithe model includes the special case in which
nal paper on irreversibility, Kenneth J.
the resale price is zero.
If we were simply to postulate that gross
Arrow (1968 pp. 8-9) argued that "there
investment cannot be negative, then it would
will be many situations in which the sale
be easy to impose irreversibility in an
of capital goods cannot be accomplished at
adjustment-cost framework by simply asthe same price as their purchase.... For
suming that infinite adjustment costs are
simplicity, we will make the extreme
incurred at any negative rate of investment,
assumption that resale of capital goods is
as in Caballero (1991 p. 281). Our approach
impossible, so that gross investment is
avoids treating irreversibility as a postulate
constrained to be non-negative." Arrow
but rather allows for (and characterizes)
showed that, in a deterministic model, opticases in which the optimal rate of investmal investment behavior under irreversibilment by the firm is never negative. We
ity will be characterized by alternating interintroduce an augmented adjustment-cost
vals of time corresponding to regimes of
positive gross investment and regimes of
function that includes traditional convex adzero gross investment. When the shadow
justment costs, as well as the possibility of
price of capital is smaller than the cost of
fixed costs and the possibility that the resale
new capital, the firm will have zero investprice of capital goods is below their purment; when the firm undertakes positive
chase price and may even be zero. In this
gross investment, the shadow price of capiaugmented adjustment-cost framework, intal equals the cost of new capital.'
vestment is a nondecreasing function of the
We incorporate both adjustment costs
shadow price q, which is always positive.
and irreversibility in an extended model
There are three regimes of optimal investof adjustment costs. We note that adment behavior characterized by two critical
justment costs and irreversibility are exvalues of q, q1 < q2. Optimal gross investamined together in a deterministic moment is positive for q > q2, zero for values
of q between q1 and q2, and negative for
q <q1. If the lower critical value, q1, is
negative, then negative gross investment is
never optimal, and investment would ap1The same relationship among gross investment, thepear to be irreversible to an outside obshadow price of capital, and the price of new capital
server. It is worth noting that irreversibility
was derived in a stochastic general-equilibrium model
does not require infinite adjustment costs at
by Thomas J. Sargent (1980). Similarly, Giuseppe
negative rates of gross investment, as asBertola and Ricardo Caballero (1994) examine the
behavior of an individual firm under uncertainty and
sumed by Caballero (1991); indeed, as long
find that the firm equates the marginal product of
as the augmented adjustment cost is strictly
capital and the user cost of capital whenever it is
positive for all negative rates of gross investundertaking gross investment; when the firm is not
investing, the marginal product of capital is below the ment, optimal investment behavior will apuser cost.
pear to be irreversible.
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In Section I we introduce the augmented
adjustment-cost function and relate optimal
investment to the shadow price q. Section II
relates the shadow price q to observable
variables in the context of two examples
that restrict attention to the investment behavior of a competitive firm. Section III
discusses the implications of competitive
equilibrium for our analysis of these examples. Section IV summarizes and outlines
future work.
I. The Model of the Firm

A. The Operating-Profit and Augmented
Adjustment-Cost Functions
Consider a firm that uses capital and a
vector of costlessly adjustable inputs, such
as labor, to produce a nonstorable output.
At each point of time, the firm chooses the
amounts of costlessly adjustable inputs to
maximize the value of its revenue minus

terms of three components: (i) purchase or
sale costs, (ii) costs of adjustment, and (iii)
fixed costs per unit time.
(i) Purchase/sale costs are the costs of

buying or selling uninstalled capital. Let pjK

be the price per unit at which the firm can
buy any amount of uninstalled capital, and

let pK be the price per unit at which the
firm can sell any amount of uninstalled cap-

ital. We assume that pK' > pK- ? 0. The sale
price of capital may be strictly less than the
purchase price of capital if, for example,
capital is firm-specific.3'4

The purchase/sale cost function is pKI
for I > 0 and PK I for I < 0. It is a (weakly)
convex and nondecreasing function that
takes the value zero when gross investment
is zero. Note that the purchase/sale cost
function is twice differentiable everywhere
except possibly at I = 0.
(ii) Adjustment costs are nonnegative

expenditures on these inputs. Let r(Kt,,costs
E) that attain their minimum value of

denote the maximized value of this instanta-

neous operating profit at time t, where Kt

is the capital stock at time t and Et is
a random variable that could represent
randomness in technology, in the prices of

costlessly adjustable inputs, or in the demand facing the firm. Assume that

zero when I = 0. As is typical in the adjustment-cost literature, we assume that adjustment costs are continuous and strictly convex in J.5,6
In some formulations, adjustment costs
also depend on the capital stock K, with the

7K(Kt, et)> 0, 7rKK(Kt, et) 0 ,2 and that

Et evolves according to a diffusion process:

(1) det = (Et) dt + (Et) dz
where z is a standard Wiener process.
Capital is acquired by undertaking gross
investment at rate I, and the capital stock

depreciates at a fixed proportional rate 8,
so the capital stock evolves according to
(2) dKt = (It - Mtdt.

When the firm undertakes gross investment, it incurs costs that we can describe in

2This formulation of the profit function allows the
firm to be either a price-taker or a price-setter. In the
examples in Section II, the firm is assumed to be a
price taker.

3Alternatively, the sale of capital may be less than its
purchase price if there is adverse selection in the
market for used capital goods. The adverse-selection
framework, however, implies heterogeneity in acquisition and sales prices across firms.
4In addition to Arrow (1968) cited in the Introduction, Nickell (1978 p. 40), Bertola and Caballero (1991
p. 1), and Robert S. Pindyck (1991 p. 1111) recognize

that pK- may be lower than pK' and choose to make
the extreme assumption that pK = 0. In the literature
on consumer durables, Pok-sang Lam (1989), Sanford
J. Grossman and Guy Laroque (1990), and Eberly
(1994) include a proportional transaction cost when

consumers resell durables, which corresponds to p-K
being smaller than pK.
Notable exceptions are Alan S. Manne (1961) and
Rothschild (1971), who analyze investment behavior
under concave adjustment costs.
6In addition, the partial derivative of the adjustment-cost function with respect to investment goes to
infinity as investment goes to infinity, and this partial
derivative goes to negative infinity as investment goes
to negative infinity.
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partial derivative of the adjustment-cost
function with respect to K being negative.7
To accommodate this case as well as the
case in which adjustment costs do not depend on K, we assume that the partial
derivative of the adjustment-cost function
with respect to K is nonpositive.
We assume that the adjustment-cost function is twice differentiable with respect
to I everywhere except possibly at I= 0.
The assumptions made so far imply that
the partial derivative of the adjustmentcost function with respect to investment is
positive for I > 0 and is negative for I < 0.
If the adjustment-cost function is differentiable at I = 0, the partial derivative of the
adjustment-cost function is zero at I = 0;
more generally, the left-hand partial derivative is nonpositive and the right-hand
derivative is nonnegative at I= 0.

limits as c(0, K). Note that c(0, K) is not
the total investment cost when I = 0, because when I = 0 the dummy variable v equals 0 and total investment cost equals
zero. Instead, c(O, K) is interpreted as the
fixed cost of investment because both
the purchase/sale cost function and the
adjustment-cost function are continuous
functions that take on the value 0 when
I = 0. Because the fixed cost is nonnegative,
we have c(O, K) ? 0. The augmented adjustment-cost function is continuous, strictly
convex, and twice differentiable with respect to I everywhere except possibly at
I = 0.8 Let c1(O, K)- and c1(O, K)+ denote
the left-hand and right-hand partial derivatives, respectively, of c(I, K) with respect to
I evaluated at I= 0. It follows from the

assumptions made above that c1(O, K)Y 2 0,

but c1(O, K)- may be positive, negative, or

zero. In addition, c(O, K)+ > c(0, K)Y.
(iii) Fixed costs of investment are nonnegative costs that are independent of the level
of investment and are incurred at each point
in time when investment is nonzero. Thus, a
firm can avoid the fixed cost of investment
at a particular point of time by setting investment equal to zero at that point of time.
We take account of all three of these
types of costs associated with capital investment. The total cost of investment equals
the product of a dummy variable v and
an "augmented adjustment-cost function"

B. Maximization: The

Optimal-Investment Function

Assume that the firm is risk-neutral and
chooses investment to maximize the expected present value of operating profit

7r(K, E) less total investment cost vc(I, K).
The value of the firm is thus

(3) V(K,, e,) = max fO Et{w(Kt+s1Et+s)

c(I,K). The dummy variable v takes the
value 0 when I = 0 so that the total investment cost is zero when I = 0. When I o 0,
the dummy variable v equals 1 so that the
total investment cost equals the augmented
adjustment cost c(I, K).
The augmented adjustment-cost function

c(I, K) represents the sum of purchase/sale
costs, adjustment costs, and fixed costs. We

- vt+Sc(It+s, Kt+s)}e-rsds

where r > 0 is the discount rate, and the
maximization in (3) is subject to the evolu-

tion of Et and Kt described in (1) and (2),

respectively.9
We will solve the maximization problem

assume that lim, I 0 c(I, K) = lim1 t 0 c(I, K) in (3) using the Bellman equationl0 (where
and denote the common value of these

7For instance, Lucas (1967, 1981), Arthur B.

8The properties noted in footnote 6 imply that

lim Ic1(I, K) = oo and lim1 , _O:c1(I, K) = - c.

Treadway (1969), Lucas and Prescott (1971), Hayashi
(1982), and Abel and Olivier J. Blanchard (1983) all
model adjustment costs as a decreasing function of K

in the value of the firm.

for a given I.

presented in Appendix A of Abel and Eberly (1993).

9While standard, this expression rules out bubbles

'OA formal derivation of this Bellman equation is
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we have suppressed the time subscript t):

(4) rV(K, e)
=max (1(K, ) - vc(I, K) + ( E(dV)}
The left-hand side of equation (4) is the
required return on the firm, and the righthand side of (4) is the maximized expected
return, which consists of two components:
operating profits net of augmented adjustment costs, rr(K, e) - vc(I, K); and the expected "capital gain" represented by the
change in the value of the firm,
(l/dt)E(dV). To calculate the expected
capital gain, we observe that the value of
the firm, V, depends on K and e, which
evolve continuously over time according to
(2) and (1), respectively. Thus, we can calculate E(dV) using Ito's lemma, equations (1)
and (2), and the facts that (dK)2 = (dKXdE)

= (dt)2 = (dz)(dt) = 0 = E(dz) to obtain

maximizes the maximand in (7) conditional
on v = 1. Then choose v to be either 0 or 1.
For the moment, assume that v = 1 and
let if (q, K) denote the maximized value of
the maximand in (7) given that v = 1.
Specifically,

(8) tf(q,K) max[qI-c(I,K)].
I

Let I*(q, K) denote the value of I that
maximizes the maximand in equation (8).
Given that c(I, K) is strictly convex in I and
is differentiable everywhere except possibly
at I = 0, the first-order conditions determining I*(q, K) are:

(9a) c,(I*(q,K),K) =q
for q < c(O, K) or q > c(O, K) +

(9b) I*(q, K) = 0

(5) E(dV)

for c(O, K) < q < c1(O, K)

= [VK(I - 8K) + x(E)V0 + 2(8)21jj dt.
Now define q VK, which is the marginal
valuation of a unit of installed capital. Substituting this definition and the expected
capital gain from equation (5) into equation
(4) yields
(6) rV=max{v(K,8)-vc(I,K)
+ q( I-8K)

+ /(E)V2 + 2(_)2V
To solve the maximization problem on

the right-hand side of (6), notice that the
only terms that involve the decision variables I and v are - vc(I, K) and qI. Therefore, the optimal values of I and v solve

(7) max[qI-vc(I,K)].
I, v

It is convenient to solve the maximization

problem in (7) in two steps. First, assume
that v = 1, and choose the value of I that

According to equation (9a) the firm equates
the marginal cost of investment and the
marginal benefit of investment, measured by

q. Notice that ci, I > 0 implies that I*(q, K)
is a strictly increasing function of q over the

range of q in equation (9a).
If c(I, K) is differentiable at I = 0, then
c1(O, K)- = c1(O, K)+ and c1(I*(q, K),K)
= q for all q. However, if c(I, K) is not
differentiable at I = 0, then for values of q
between c(O, K)- and c,(O, K)+ there is
no corresponding value of the marginal cost
of investment. As shown in equation (9b)
for values of q in this range, I*(q, K) = 0.
Looking at equations (9a) and, (9b) together, we see that I*(q, K) is a nondecreasing function over the entire range of q,
and that

J< 0 for q < c(O, K)

(10) I*(q K)) =? for?c(O,K) <q
> 0 for q > c,(O, K)+.
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Having determined the optimal value of I
given that v - 1, we now turn to the choice
of the optimal value of v. If v = 0, gross
investment is also zero, and the value of the
maximand in equation (7) is zero. If v = 1,
the optimal rate of investment is I*(q, K)
and the value of the maximand in (8) is

\ 00, K) - c(, K) + /

q, ~~~~~~~~~q2

(11) fr(q, K)

-c(O,K) K-

= qI*(q, K) - c( I*(q, K), K).
FIGURE 1. THE REWARD TO INVESTING

The firm will therefore choose v = 1 when,
yields
and only when, qi(q, K) is greater than
zero."1 To determine the sign of ir(q, K),
(13) di1q(q, K)
we now characterize the behavior of this

function. Recall from equation (9b) that for
c,(O, K)- < q < c,(O, K)+, I*(q, K) = 0.
Substituting zero investment into the righthand side of (11) yields

(12) qr(q, K) =-c(O, K)

<0 if q<c1(O,K)

I=0 if c1(0,K) q
<c,(0,K) +

> 0 if q > c1(O, K) +
(14) q1qq(q, K) =Iq*(q, K)> O
if q < c(O, K) or if q > c(O, K)

if c(0, K) < q < c1(O, K)

Thus, the function qi(q, K) is a convex

function that attains its minimum value of
For values of q outside the interval

[c(O, K)-, c1(O, K)]+ , qi(q, K) > - c(O, K)
because the firm could always choose to set
I = 0 and thereby attain a value of - c(0, K)
for qI - c(I, K). Thus, the minimum value

of i(q, K) is attained for q in the interval
[c1(O, K)-, c1(O, K)+ ]. Outside this interval,
i(q, K) is twice differentiable with respect
to q. Differentiating equation (11) with re-

spect to q and using equations (9a) and (10)

- c(O, K) when q is in the interval
[c(O, K)-, c(O, K)]+ . Let q1 and q2 denote
the smallest and largest roots, respectively,

of qi(q, K) = 0. It follows from equation (13)
that

(15) qf(q, K) > 0 if q < q1 or q > q2.
The function qi(q, K) is depicted in Figure 1 for a given value of K. The flat

segment of qf(q, K) for values of q between

c1(0, K)- and c1(O, K)+ corresponds to

equation (12). Figure 1 is drawn under the

assumption that the fixed cost, c(O, K) is
ilWhen fr(q, K) = 0, the firm is indifferent between
positive, so that the minimum value of
I = 0 and I = I*(q, K). Of course, if I*(q, K) = 0, the
optimal rate of investment is zero. If I*(q, K) * 0, we

O(q, K) is negative, and the flat segment

has zero measure.

Thus, in the case depicted in Figure 1, the

assume that the firm chooses to set investment equal to
lies below the horizontal axis. According to
zero at these points of indifference. The time path of
equation (13), qi(q, K) is strictly decreasing
K is unaffected by this assumption because qthe left of the flat segment and strictly
VK(K, e) follows a diffusion process, which implies to
that
increasing to the right of the flat segment.
the set of times when q,(q, K) = 0 and I*(q, K) O 0
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equation if(q, K) = 0 has two distinct roots,

Case III: fi(q,K)=O has a continuum of

q1 and q2; qi(q, K)> 0 if q < q1 or if q > q2. roots so that there is a nondegenerate range

Thus, optimal investment behavior I(q, K)
is characterized by

tI*(q, K) < 0if q<q1

(16) I(q, K) = if ql<q<q2
I*(q,K)>0 if q>q2-

C. Characteristics of Optimal
Investment and q

(i) As shown in equation (16), the optimal rate of investment is zero when q is in

of inaction. If (a) the augmented adjustment-cost function c(I, K) is not differentiable at I = 0 so that c1(0, K)- <
c1(O, K)+ [implying that there is a flat
segment at the bottom of f(q, K)] and
(b) the fixed cost c(0, K) = 0, so that the
flat segment at the bottom of ifl(q, K) lies
along the horizontal axis, then i(q, K) = 0
has a continuum of roots extending from

q, to q2. For any value of q in this range,
the optimal rate of investment is zero.

(ii) The largest and smallest roots of the

equation qi(q, K) = 0, q, and q2, depend

the interval [ql, q21. We will show that q2 > only on the specification of the augmented

adjustment-cost function c(I, K). They are
independent of the specification of the
operating-profit function 7(K, E) and the
specification of the diffusion process for Et.
(iii) If there are positive fixed costs or if
In general qf(q, K) = 0 may have either a c(I, K) is not differentiable at I = 0, there is
a nondegenerate range of inaction. If there
unique root or more than one root. If there
are positive fixed costs, the function I(q, K)
is more than one root, there are either two
is discontinuous; the optimal rate of investroots or a continuum of roots. We describe
ment jumps from a negative value to zero at
each of these three cases below.

q1, so that this range of inaction for investment is nondegenerate, if there are fixed
costs of investment [c(O, K) > 0] or if the
augmented adjustment-cost function is nondifferentiable with respect to I at I = 0.

Case I: f(q, K) = 0 has a unique root so that

q = ql, and it jumps from zero to a positive

value at q = q2.

q, = q2 and the range of inaction is degen- (iv) If min, c(I, K) 2 0, it is never opti-

erate. The equation qf(q, K)= 0 has a

unique root if (a) c(I, K) is differentiable
at I = 0 so that c1(O, K)- = c1(O, K)+, and
hence there is no flat segment at the

mal for the firm to undertake negative gross
investment; the firm's behavior is observationally equivalent to a situation of irreversible investment.12 Note from the defini-

bottom of the O(q,K) function; and tion
(b) of qi(q, K) in equation (8) that qi(0, K)

the fixed cost c(O, K) = 0 so that the mini-= max, - c(I, K) = - min, c(I, K) so that if
mum value of f(q, K) is zero. These two
min c(I, K) 2 0, then qi(0, K) < 0. But if
assumptions are fairly standard in the
qf(0, K) < 0, then q,, the smallest root of
tf(q, K) = 0, is nonpositive. Therefore it is
adjustment-cost literature, and they account for the absence of a range of inacimpossible for q, which must be positive
tion in much of this literature (see e.g.,
[see equation (20)], to be less than q1, and
John P. Gould, 1968; Richard Hartman,
1972; Abel and Blanchard, 1983).
Case II: ifr(q, K) = 0 has exactly two roots so
12Caballero (1991 p. 281) specifies the augmented
that there is a nondegenerate range of inacadjustment-cost function C(I) = I + [I > 0],1IP + [I <
tion. The equation ifr(q, K)= 0 has ex0]721I P where 8 ? 1, Y I 0,72? 0, and the brackets
actly two distinct roots if the fixed cost
denote the indicator function. Caballero states that
"the irreversible-investment case of Pindyck (1988) and
c(O, K) > 0 so that the minimum value of
Bertola (1988) corresponds to the case in which ym = 0,
f(q, K) is negative. With a positive fixed
Y2 = , and 3 = 1." In fact, however, if 3 = 1, irrecost of investment, a nondegenerate range
versibility will occur whenever Y2 > 1. There is no need
of inaction will arise regardless of the
to make Y2 infinite to prevent optimal investment from
being negative.
differentiability of c(I, K) at I = 0.
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the optimal rate of investment cannot be
negative.13 This result has a straightforward
explanation. In order for a firm to find it
optimal to give up some of its installed
capital, which has a positive value, the augmented adjustment cost it incurs must be
negative (i.e., the net sale price of the capital after taking account of the fixed cost and
the adjustment cost must be positive). If
there is no value of gross investment for

yields

(19) (r?+)q
E{dq}

=7IK(K,e)-VCK(I,K) + dt
Equation (19) is essentially an Euler equa-

tion from the calculus of variations. The
left-hand side of equation (19) is the required return (gross return before subtractwhich c(I, K) is negative, then it will never ing depreciation) on the valuation of the
be optimal for a firm to undertake negative marginal unit of capital, and the right-hand
gross investment.
side is the expected return, which consists
(v) Note that the Bellman equation in
of three components: the marginal operequation (6) holds identically in K at a
ating profit 7nK(K, c), the marginal reducpoint in time so the partial derivative of the
tion in the augmented adjustment cost
left-hand side with respect to K equals the
- VCK(I, K), and the expected capital gain
partial derivative of the right-hand side with E{dq}/dt. In the special case in which there
respect to K. Differentiating both sides of
is no uncertainty, equation (19) becomes
(6) with respect to K yields
(r + 8)q = 7K(K, E) - vCK(I, K) + dq/dt,
which is widely used in the deterministic
literature on the q theory of investment
(see e.g., Blanchard and Stanley Fishcher,
(17) rVK= VK(K,E) -CK(1, K)
1989 p. 62).

(vi) The marginal valuation of installed
-q + qK( I - 5K)

+ A(?)Ve,K + 2 K
A

where I is optimal investment from equa-

tion (16) and v is the optimal choice of v.
Recall that q VK so that q =Ve,K and
qe,e = Ve,e,K. Now apply Ito's lemma and

equations (1) and (2) to calculate E{dq}:

(18) E{dq} = qK(I -K) dt

capital, q, is the expected present value of
the stream of marginal products of capital.
This result can be shown formally using the
following lemma, which is a special case of
the Feynman-Kac formula (see loannis
Karatzas and Steven E. Shreve, 1988 p. 267).
A simple proof is given in appendix B of
Abel and Eberly (1993).
LEMMA 1: Suppose that Xt is a diffusion
and that a> 0 is constant. Then Xt =

Et{fOgt,e a'ds) is a solution to the differential equation Et(dx)/dt - aVt + gt = 0.
Using the fact that qt is a diffusion and

applying this lemma to equation (19)
+ AW(K)I, K dt + ,o( )2I ,eK dt. yields'4
00

Substituting (18) into (17) and rearranging (20) qt =fEt{rK ( Kt +s, Et +s)

- Vt+scK( It+s, Kt+S)le-(r+)s ds

13To show that q2, the largest root of /(q, K) = 0, is
not negative, we suppose that q2 < 0 and show that this >0.
assumption leads to a contradiction. If q2 <O, then
according to equation (16), I(O, K) = I*(0, K) > 0. Recall that c1(0, K)+ > 0 so that equation (10) implies
that I*(O, K) < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore
14We have chosen the solution to equation (19) that
does not contain bubbles.
q2 ? 0.
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Case
I: c(I,
K) is linearly homogenous in I
Thus, qt is the present value of
the
stream

of expected marginal profit of capital which

consists of two components: rK(K, 8) is the

and K.-We can show that if the operating
profit function satisfies equation (21), and if

marginal operating profit accruing to capi-

c(I, K) is linearly homogeneous in I and K,

tal, and - vcK(I, K) is the reduction in
the augmented adjustment cost accruing to
the marginal unit of capital. The assump-

then

tions made above that 7K(K, 8) > 0 and

In this case, the shadow price of capital,

(22) V(K, ) =q() K.

q(E), equals the average value of capital,
CK(I, K) ? 0 imply that qt is always positive.
II. Relating the Shadow Price q to
Observable Variables

We have shown that optimal investment
is a nondecreasing function of the shadow
price of capital, which is called q. In general, we cannot directly observe shadow
prices. In this section we restrict our attention to perfectly competitive firms with linearly homogeneous production functions
and derive expressions for q in terms of
observable variables. In the first example, q

equals the value of the firm divided by its
capital stock (Tobin's q), and in the second
example q is a function of the price of
output, the real interest rate, and parameters describing the price of output and the
production function.
Consider a competitive firm that uses capital, K, and a vector of costlessly adjustable
inputs, L, to produce output according to

the production function F(K, L, ). Assume
that the production function F(K, L, ) is
linearly homogeneous in K and L, and note
that the production function may be subject

to stochastic shocks. In addition, the competitive prices of output and inputs may be
subject to stochastic shocks. It is well known
that if the firm is a price-taker in output
and factor markets, the operating profit can
be written as

(21) T(K,E) = H(E)K

V(K,E)/K, which is observable using security market prices and is known as Tobin's
q. This result extends Hayashi's (1982) result, which was derived in a deterministic
model, to a stochastic model that admits
irreversibility.
The value function in equation (22) is
implied by the following lemma, proved in
Appendix A.

LEMMA 2: Suppose that wr(K, e) and
c(I, K) are homogeneous of degree p in
I and K. Then the value function can be
written as V(K, e) = A(E)KP, and q

VK(K, e) = p V(K, 1)/K.
Thus, when the operating profit function
and the augmented adjustment-cost function are of the same degree of homogeneity,

marginal q and average q are proportional.
In the special case where p = 1 [so that
equation (21) holds, and the augmented
adjustment-cost function is linearly homogeneous], Lemma 2 indicates that average and
marginal q are equal, as in equation (22).
We now discuss the content of the assumption that c(I,K) is linearly homogeneous. Recall that c(I,K) has three components: (i) a purchase/sale cost; (ii) an
adjustment cost; and (iii) a fixed cost.

(i) As we discussed in Section I, the purchase/sale cost is pK I for I> 0 and

PK-I for I < 0. Obviously, a doubling of

where H(E) > O."
be the vector of ratios of the costlessly adjustable inputs to the capital stock. It follows from the

15The operating profit in this case can be written as
v(K, e) = maxL[p(E, Q)F(K, L, E) - w(e)'L], where
p(e, Q) is the given price of the firm's output, w(E) is
the vector of given prices of the costlessly adjustable
inputs, and Q is industry output. Note that all of the
prices may be potentially random. Let A - L/K

linear homogeneity of F(K, L, E) that 7r(K, E) =

maxx[p(e, Q)F(1, A, e) - w(E)'A]K. The maximand in
square brackets is independent of the individual firm's
capital stock, K, and thus the operating-profit function
can be written as in equation (21), where H(E) =

max[ p(E, Q)F(1, A, E)-W(E)'X]-
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I and K doubles the purchase/sale
cost, so the purchase/sale cost function is a linearly homogeneous function
of I and K.
(ii) In the literature in which the adjustment-cost function depends on K as
well as on I, it is commonly assumed
that the adjustment-cost function is linearly homogeneous in I and K.16

of the scale of the firm.18 If q1 < 0, then the
negative investment regime is never operative, and as explained in Section I, investment would appear to be irreversible.

Case II: cK(I, K) O.-Now assume that
the augmented adjustment-cost function
does not depend on the capital stock (for-

mally, CK(I, K) O).19 We continue to as(iii) The fixed cost of investment, c(O, K), is sume that the firm is perfectly competitive
independent of the amount of investment I. If this fixed cost reflects the
cost of stopping production while new

and has a linearly homogeneous production
function so that the operating profit function is proportional to the capital stock

capital is installed,'7 it is proportional
to the operating profit function H(E)K

[equation (21)]. Under these assumptions,

we show in Appendix B that the value funcwhich is, of course, proportional to K.
tion is a linear function of the capital stock
In this case, the fixed cost, c(O, K), is a regardless of the specification of the diffulinearly homogeneous function of I and
sion for e. In particular,

K (even though it is independent of I).
(25) V(K, e) = q(E) K + J(E)
If the purchase/sale cost, the adjustment
cost, and fixed cost are all linearly homoge-

neous functions of I and K, then c(I, K) is
linearly homogeneous in I and K and can
be written as

where J(E)> 0. To get an explicit expression for q(E) in terms of the underlying
stochastic process, we will focus on particular parametric specifications of the operating profit function and the diffusion for e. It

is not necessary to restrict c(I, K) further.
Consider a competitive firm that uses capital and labor to produce output according
where G(H) is continuous and convex,
andCobb-Douglas production function
to the
except possibly at zero, is twice differenvLaKl-, where 0<a<1, and v>0 is a
tiable. In this case, c(I, K) = G'(I/K), so
productivity parameter that may be stochasthat equations (16) and (9a) yield
tic. The firm pays a constant wage rate w
per unit of labor and sells its output at a
price P that may be stochastic. Define p
G (G (q)<O if q<q1
Pu and observe that the instantaneous oper(24) -K= 0 if ql<q<q2
ating profit equals the revenue from selling
tG l(q) > if q >q2
output minus the cost of labor so that

(23) C(I, K) K- K K1) KG(K

Notice that the optimal investment-capital
ratio depends only on q, and since q is
independent of the capital stock, the optimal investment-capital ratio is independent

16Lucas (1967,1981), Lucas and Prescott (1971),
Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Blanchard (1983) all
make this assumption.

(26) r(K,p) max[pLaKla - wL] = hp0K
L

where h (1- a)a/(1a)w-a/(l-a) > 0 and
0 1/(1 - a)> 1.

18Lucas (1967) highlights this feature in a determin-

istic model with a linearly homogeneous operating
17Rothschild (1971 p. 609) and Nickell (1978 p. 37) profit function and convex costs of adjustment.
both suggest that the cost of stopping production would
19This assumption is adopted by Eisner and Strotz
(1963), Gould (1968), Rothschild (1971), Richard
rise to a fixed cost of investment. In addition
Rothschild suggests that breaking in new equipment or
Hartman (1972), Mussa (1977), Nickell (1978), Pindyck
procedures is costly.
(1982), Abel (1983), and Cabellero (1991).
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At time t, the present value of marginal
profits accruing to the undepreciated por-

tion of currently installed capital is20
00

(27) qt = h Et P+s)e-(r+6)sds.

given pt. If the initial value of q, is less

than q1 or greater than or equal to q2, the

increase in q, increases investment, which is

consistent with Hartman (1972), Abel (1983),
and Caballero (1991). But note that if the

initial value of q, is in the interval [q1, q2), a

small increase in oa will not move q, out of

this interval, and investment will remain
unchanged and equal to zero. Thus, with
(27), and the value of qt, under the assumpthe more general adjustment-cost function
tion that p evolves according to the geometintroduced in this paper, we have the result
ric Brownian motion
that investment is a nondecreasing function
We calculate the expectations in equation

(28)

-=

dp
adz
P

where z follows a standard Wiener process.

of a- for a given p,
III. Competitive Equilibrium24
In a recent paper Pindyck (1993) ques-

tions the relevance of adjustment costs in
In this case, the distribution of ln pt+ conditional on pt is N(ln pt - 1(o2S, o-2s) so that competitive equilibrium for firms with con-

(29) Et{P+s) = P" exp[ 2(-1)O2s

stant returns to scale. Pindyck also points
out that considerations of industry equilibrium may reverse the findings of Hartman

(1972), Abel (1983), and Caballero (1991)
Substituting equation (29) into equation (27)

concerning the effects of uncertainty on investment by competitive firms.
and simplifying yields21
We first address Pindyck's argument that
adjustment costs are irrelevant in a perhp 0
fectly competitive industry in which firms
(30) qt= [r?8N-6(6_1)T 2]
have constant returns to scale. His argument applies to the case in which the
adjustment-cost function depends only on
the rate of investment, and not on the capiNow suppose that 0 < q1 < q2 so that all
tal stock (see Pindyck, 1993 p. 274). Observe
three investment regimes are potentially operative, 22 and consider the effects of an from equation (25) that, under constant returns to scale and this form of the
increase in the instantaneous standard deviadjustment-cost function, the value of a
ation U.23 It follows directly from equation

(30) that an increase in a increases qt for a

competitive firm with capital stock K* is

q(E)K* + JAE). If this firm could costlessly

divide itself into two firms with capital stock
K*/2, each of the two firms would be worth
2OAs in equation (20), we assume that there is no
bubble in the shadow price q.

q(E)K*/2+ JAE); the total value of the two

firms would be q(E)K* + 2J(E), which is
21We assume that r + 8 - 10(o - 1)_2> 0 so that
greater than the value of the original firm.
the integral in equation (27) converges.
22 Recall that mm1 c(I, K) < 0 is necessary and suf- Thus, provided that new firms can be freely

ficient for q1 > 0. Either c(0, K) > 0 or c1(0, K)- <
c1(O, K) + is sufficient for q2 > q1.
23When we consider the effects of a change in a
parameter such as o-, we are actually comparing the
behavior of two otherwise identical firms with different
constant values of the parameter in question. This
analysis does not apply to the effect on a given firm of
a change in the parameter because the firm's optimization problem assumes that the parameters are known
with certainty to be constant over time.

created, firms would have an incentive to

24We thank an anonymous referee for raising the
issues that motivated us to write this section.

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:44:00 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

1380 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 1994

divide into smaller parts. In addition, if
there is free entry, potential entrants would
enter the industry because even with no

capital a firm has a positive value JAE).
Pindyck argues that "in the limit, the industry would be composed of an infinite number of infinitesimally small firms, and so
each firm would have no adjustment costs"
(p. 274) because they would each have infinitesimally small rates of investment.
Pindyck's conclusion that each firm would
have no adjustment cost is based on the

assumption that lim1 0 c*(I, K) = 0 and
lim 0 c (I, K) = 0, where c*(I, K) is the
adjustment-cost function, rather than the

augmented adjustment-cost function. While
this assumption is fairly standard in formulations of the adjustment-cost function in
which CK is identically zero, adjustment
costs will not become irrelevant in our Case
I, in which the augmented adjustment-cost
function is linearly homogeneous in I and
K. As we have shown, the value of the firm
is strictly proportional to its capital stock in
this case. Therefore, a firm with zero capital
has zero value, so that even with free entry
there are no rents to be earned by potential
entrants with zero capital. In this case, the
size distribution of firms is indeterminate. It
is possible that some firms will have infinitesimally small capital stocks and rates
of investment, but even for these firms adjustment costs are not irrelevant. Arbitrarily
small firms will have arbitrarily small values
of I and K, but the value of I/K will still

Pindyck's second argument is that, even if
for some reason firms cannot be arbitrarily
small, the response of existing firms and
free entry will cause the equilibrium price
to respond endogenously to shocks. Most
studies of investment behavior by competitive firms under uncertainty ignore this endogenous response of equilibrium price. Although a competitive firm is a price-taker, a
competitive industry is not a price-taker.
Specifically, a shock that hits all firms in an
industry is likely to affect industry output
and thus the equilibrium price. However, a
shock that hits only one competitive firm in
an industry will not affect industry output or
the equilibrium price.

Pindyck (1993) analyzes endogenous price
responses to industry-wide shocks to reexamine the results of Hartman (1972), Abel

(1983), and Caballero (1991), who find that
increased uncertainty increases the investment of competitive firms with constant returns to scale. Pindyck shows that if all firms
in an industry face identical realizations of

the random variable(s) impacting the industry, then taking account of the endogenous
response of the equilibrium price tends to
reverse the findings of Hartman, Abel, and
Caballero. However, it should be noted that
if competitive firms face only idiosyncratic
shocks, then the results of Hartman, Abel,
and Caballero continue to hold. Our analysis in Case II would be subject to Pindyck's
criticism if we interpret the uncertainty
about p Pu as arising from demand shocks
be given by equation (24), which depends on
that affect the competitive price of output
the augmented adjustment-cost function.25
P, which is identical for all firms in a competitive industry; however, our analysis in
Thus, Pindyck's (1993) argument about the
Case II is immune to Pindyck's criticism if
irrelevance of adjustment costs under conthe uncertainty arises from a productivity
stant returns to scale and perfect competishock v that is idiosyncratic to a particular
tion does not apply when the augmented
firm.26
adjustment-cost function is linearly homogeneous in I and K, as in our Case I.
26The issue of the endogenous response of equilibrium price to shocks does not arise in our analysis of

25Recall from equation (23) that in this case the
augmented adjustment-cost function can be written as
KG(I/K), where G(*) is continuous and convex. Although the augmented adjustment cost KG(I/K) goes
to zero as K goes to zero, the marginal augmented
adjustment cost G'(I/K), evaluated at optimal I, does
not go to zero as K goes to zero.

Case I, because we need not specify the relationship
between price and the source of uncertainty. Indeed,
our analysis of Case I did not use any specification for
the evolution of the price of output. Whatever the
behavior of the price of output, and however it responds to shocks, competitive firms take the price of
output as given.
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IV. Conclusion

APPENDIX A

In this paper we have extended the adjustment-cost framework under uncertainty
to incorporate fixed costs of investment, a
wedge between the purchase price and sale
price of capital, and potential irreversibility
of investment. In this extended framework,
investment is a nondecreasing function of q,
the shadow price of installed capital, and
there are potentially three investment
regimes which depend on the value of q
relative to the critical values q1 and q2.
Conveniently, these critical values depend
only on the specification of the augmented
adjustment-cost function. If q is greater
than q2, then, as is standard in the q-theory
branch of the adjustment-cost literature, investment is positive and is an increasing
function of q. If q is between q1 and q2,
then the investment is zero. Although this
regime features prominently in the irreversibility literature, it is largely ignored in
the adjustment-cost literature. Finally, if q

PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
The operating-profit function and the
augmented adjustment-cost function are homogeneous of degree p in I and K so that

(Al) r(K,) = H(E)KP
and

(A2) c(I,K)=G ( KP.

Then the value function in equation (3) can
be written as

(A3) V(Kt ,Et)

I,max Etf[H(Et+s)-v+sG(it+s)]KP s e-rs ds

where i+S - I+/Kt+s is the (gross) growth

rate of the capital stock. Consider a firm
is less than ql, gross investment is negative,

a possibility that is simply ruled out by assumption in the irreversibility literature.
The shadow price q is in general not
observable, so we presented two examples
relating q to observable variables. In one

with capital stock K(1) at time t, and let

I>() and i(l) denote the optimal values

of the dummy variable v and the
investment-capital ratio chosen by this firm
at time t + s. This optimal behavior leads to

example, restrictions on the production

a capital stock of K()S at time t. The value

function and the augmented adjustment-cost
function guarantee that q is identically equal

of the firm at time t is V(KV1), E). Now

to the average value of the capital stock,
which is observable using security prices. In
the other example, we tightly specify the
production function and the diffusion process for the random variable p (the product
of the output price and a productivity parameter) and derive an expression for q as a
function of the contemporaneous value of
p. In this example, p does not have a stationary distribution, and hence q does not
have a stationary distribution. In ongoing
research we are examining the behavior of
q and investment in the presence of a
mean-reverting process for p so that q will
have a stationary distribution. The ultimate
goal of this line of research is to derive an
econometric specification to apply these
models to aggregate and disaggregate data
on investment.

consider a second firm with a capital stock

at time t equal to K (2) = aK(') with a > 0.
This firm has the option of choosing exactiy
the same values of the dummy variable v
and the investment-capital ratio I/K at
every point of time as chosen by the firm

with capital stock K(l). If the second firm
were to set = v-(1 ) and 4Th for
all s > 0, then Kts would equal aKMl for
all s> 0. Because the cash flow at time
t + s is proportional to KP+s in equation
(A3), the second firm has the option of
obtaining an expected present value of cash

flows equals to a PV(K ('), t). Therefore,
(A4) V(ac}Kt, Et ) 2 atPV(Kt, e ) .
Equation (A4) holds for any Kt and for any

positive factor a. In particular, consider a
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first firm that has a capital stock of aKt at
time t, and a second firm that has a capital

stock of Kt = (1/a)aKt at time t. There-

fore, the argument preceding equations (A4)

neous in I and K so that w,(K, e) = HWK
(see footnote 15). We will verify that
V(K, ) = q(E)K + JE) satisfies (Bi). Substituting V(K, e) = q(E)K + J(E) and

w,(K, e) = HGW)K into (Bi) and recalling th

implies that

definition of q yields

(AS) V(Kt,Et) 2(1/a) OV(aKt,Et).
Putting together equations (A4) and (AS)

(B2) rq(E)K + rJ(E)

we have V(aKt, Ed ? aPV(Kt, Ed >

= max{H(E)K - vc(I)
I,'v

V(aKt, I ), which implies

+ q(E)(I - AK) + p(e)q6K + j(e)J6?

(A6) V(aKt, Et) = al'V(Kt, Et).

+ IO(E)2 q K+ 2ff(E)2j'}j-

Because equation (A6) holds for any posi-

terms in K yields
tive Kt and any positive a, the value of Collecting
the
firm is proportional to the capital stock to

the power p, and hence the value function
can be written as

(B3) [(r+ 8)q(E) -A(E)q6 -( -) q?- H(E)]K
= max[q(e)I - vc(I)]

(A7) V( Kt, Et) )A( Et) KP -

1,jv

- rJ(E) + gE)J6 + 2f(E)2j??

Partially differentiating (A7) with respect to

Kt yields

V( Kt, -c)

qt VK (Kt, Et ) _p V(Kt,sKt

In order for (B3) to hold for all K, the
term in square brackets on the left-hand
side must equal zero, and the right-hand
side of (B3) must also equal zero. Note that
from equation (8) we can write

APPENDIX B

The Value Function When the

(B4) max [ q(E) I - vc(I)] = max[O, +i(q)].
I, V

Augmented Adjustment-Cost Function
Does Not Depend on the Capital Stock

The optimal program of the firm is governed by the differential equation given in

the text equation (6). Here we assume that
cK(I, K) 0, so we write the augmented
adjustment-cost function, c(I, K) as simply
c(I).

(Bl) rV(K, e)

Setting the right-hand side and the left-hand

side of (B3) equal to zero yields

(B5) max[O,q((q(E))] - rJ(E) + L(E))JE
+ 2(T 2 E
and

(B6) H(E)-(r + )q(E) +1 (E)q_E

= max { 7r(K, ?) - vc(I) + q(I - AK)
I,vi

+ 2(T(6 2qE =?
+ ,U(E)V + -

Note that both differential equations are of
Now suppose that the firm is a price-taker
in output and factor markets and has a
production function that is linearly homoge-

the form

(B7) g(E) - aX(E) + E(dX/dt) = 0.
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ment." Review of Economic Studies, April
1994, 61(207), pp. 223-46.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Fischer, Stanley. Lectures on macroeconomics. Cambridge,
(B8) X(--t) = Et| g(_-t+,e-"sds.
MA: MIT Press, 1989.
Caballero, Ricardo J. "On the Sign of
the Investment-Uncertainty RelationSince equations (B5) and (B6) are both of
ship." American Economic Review, March
the form in equation (B7), we substitute
1991, 81(1), pp. 279-88.
from these into equation (B8) to conclude:
Eberly, Janice C. "Adjustment of Consumers'
Durables Stocks: Evidence from Automobile Purchases." Journal of Political Econ(B9) J(Et) = Et max[O, q(qt+ )]ersds
omy, June 1994, 102(3), pp. 403-36.
Eisner, Robert and Strotz, Robert H. " Determinants of Business Investment," in Com(B10) q(--t) = E, H(Et+s)e-(r+S)s ds.
mission on Money and Credit, Impacts of
monetary policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1963, pp. 59-337.
Therefore, 1(e) can be interpreted as the
Gould, John P. "Adjustment Costs in the
present value of rents accruing to the firm
Theory of Investment of the Firm." Refrom the augmented adjustment technology,
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